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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-
2a-3(2)(e) (1953 as amended). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
I. Did the Trial Court err in denying Mr. Karsten's Motion to Suppress by upholding 
Trooper Taylor's use of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-140 as a basis to stop Mr. Karsten's vehicle which 
was displaying small blue decorative lights? 
In evaluating the Trial Court's denial of Mr. Karsten's Motion to Suppress, this Court will 
review the factual findings for clear error, but to ensure that search and seizure standards are applied 
similarly throughout the State, this Court will review the Trial Court's legal conclusions for 
correctness, giving no deference to the Trial Court's application of law to the facts. State v. Brake, 
2004 UT 95, pp.12-15, 103 P.3d 699; see also State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 125, p. 26, 63 P.3d 650 
("State-wide standards also help ensure different trial judges will reach the same legal conclusion 
in cases that have little actual difference"). 
II. Did the Trial Court err in denying Mr. Karsten's Motion to Suppress the Terry frisk 
performed after Mr. Karsten had exited the vehicle, thereby violating Mr. Karsten's rights to be free 
from unreasonable searches and seizures under both State and Federal Constitutions? 
In evaluating the Trial Court's denial of Mr. Karsten's Motion to Suppress, this Court will 
review the factual findings for clear error, but to ensure that search and seizure standards are applied 
similarly throughout the State, this Court will review the Trial Court's legal conclusions for 
correctness, giving no deference to the Trial Court's application of law to the facts. State v. Brake, 
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2004 UT 95, pp.12-15, 103 P.3d 699; see also State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 125, p. 26, 63 P.3d 650. 
(State-wide standards also help ensure different trial judges will reach the same legal conclusion in 
cases that have little actual difference.) 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL 
AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
I. Motion to Suppress for Validity of the Stop. 
Determinative Constitutional provisions include the U.S. Const., amend. IV and the Utah 
Const., art. I, § 14. The determinative statutory provisions include Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-140(2). 
II. Motion to Suppress for Illegality of Terry Frisk. 
Determinative Constitutional provisions include the U.S. Const., amend. IV and the Utah 
Const., art. I, § 14. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case arises out of the denial of a Motion to Suppress ruled upon by the Honorable Lyle 
R. Anderson in the Seventh Judicial District Court of San Juan County, State of Utah and the 
preservation of the issue for appellate review under State v. Seryy 758 P.2d 935 (Utah App. 1988), 
by entering a conditional plea of guilt to the underlying charges with the ability to withdraw that 
guilty plea if this Court determines that the evidence should have been suppressed. 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
AND DISPOSITION BELOW 
An information was filed in this case against Brian Karsten ("Mr. Karsten") charging him 
with two counts of violating Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2) illegal use and possession of a controlled 
substance, a third degree felony; one count of violating Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5(l), possession 
of drug paraphernalia; and one count of violating Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.6, driving with a 
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measurable controlled substance. 
On November 15, 2004, Mr. Karsten through counsel filed a Motion to Suppress. The 
Motion was heard on December 20, 2004. After hearing the law and facts and the testimony in the 
case, the Court denied the Motion to Suppress stating that the officer had probable cause to stop Mr. 
Karsten's vehicle, and after the stop had probable cause to perform a Terry frisk on Mr. Karsten after 
he had exited his vehicle. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Per Mr. Karsten's burden to marshal all evidence supporting the Judge's decision to deny Mr. 
Karsten's Motion to Suppress, the following facts and testimony are presented in the light most 
favorable to the District Court's ruling. 
I. Facts Pertaining to the Motion to Suppress 
1. Mr. Karsten is a Colorado citizen living in Colorado and maintaining a 
Colorado drivers license. (Record ("R") at docket page 1, 5, 8, 10, 12, 15, 22, 24, 41, 43.) 
2. Mr. Karsten's Motion to Suppress was heard in the Seventh Judicial District Court 
in San Juan County in the city of Monticello before the Honorable Lynn R. Anderson on December 
20, 2004. (Judgement roll and index docket at pages 5 and 6, record at 25, 40,48, and 62 pages 1-
34.) 
Evidence Presented at Motion to Suppress 
3. The testimony presented shows that Mr. Karsten had on his front license plate 
decorative lights that were blue in color, illuminated, and pointed forward. These lights were an 
alleged violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-140(2) and were the only reason for the Trooper's stop 
of Mr. Karsten's vehicle. (Record at 62 pages 4, 5, 9, 11-13, 17-24.) 
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Evidence Presented at the Suppression Hearing Offered in Support of the Terry Frisk. 
4. When the Trooper approached Mr. Karsten's vehicle, he initially saw a knife in the 
seat of the car behind the driver. (Record at 62 pages 7, 9, 14-15.) 
5. When the Trooper asked Mr. Karsten for a correct insurance card, he 
reached up toward where the driver's side visor should have been and as the Trooper watched him 
reaching him for papers stored in that section of the car's interior, the Trooper noticed a second knife 
tucked in with the papers Mr. Karsten was reaching for. (Record at 62 pages 5-7, 9, 15-16.) 
6. The Trooper, to separate Mr. Karsten from the vehicle that had knives, asked Mr. 
Karsten to exit the vehicle for the Trooper's safety. (Record at 62 pages 5-7, 9, 15-16.) 
7. Mr. Karsten complied and as he left the vehicle the Trooper indicated he saw things 
in Mr. Karsten5 s pocket. (Record at 62 page 16.) 
8. The stop occurred on a fairly remote area of the southeastern corner of Utah and the 
stop occurred at approximately 9:09 p.m. on August 1, 2004 when the lighting was becoming dark, 
if not dark already. The Trooper performed a Terry frisk and found controlled substances on Mr. 
Karsten during that search. (Record at 62 pages 28-29.) 
Court's Ruling 
9. The Court ruled that the Trooper had probable cause to stop Mr. Karsten because of 
the violation of the statute on the decorative license plate lights on the front of Mr. Karsten's 
vehicle. (Record at 62 page 31.) 
10. The Court ruled that the Terry frisk was supported by probable cause. (Record at 62 
pages 31,32, 33 and 34.) 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The District Court erred in its ruling by denying Mr. Karsten's Motion to Suppress in two 
instances. First, that the violation of the statutory prohibition against front facing blue lights is a 
non-safety related equipment violation and, as such, does not give the Trooper reason to engage in 
a Level 2 stop under the Fourth Amendment or art. I, § 14 of the Utah Constitution. 
Secondly, the District Court erred in its ruling by denying Mr. Karsten's Motion to Suppress 
under the ruling that the Terry search was appropriate when Mr. Karsten cooperated with the Trooper 
and gave the Trooper no reason to fear for his safety due to Mr. Karsten's complete cooperation with 
the Trooper. 
ARGUMENT 
L THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING M R KARSTEN'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
BY UPHOLDING TROOPER TAYLOR'S USE OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6-140(2) AS A 
BASIS TO STOP MR. KARSTEN'S VEHICLE. 
The statute under which Mr. Karsten was stopped, Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-140, has since 
been amended and renumbered, and is now § 41-6a-1616. In analyzing a statute for its intent, the 
first law of statutory construction is to read the entire statute as a whole. Utah Code Ann. § 41 -6-140 
provided: 
(1) During the times specified in Section 41-6-118, any lighted lamp or illuminating 
device upon a motor vehicle, other than head lamps, spot lamps, auxiliary lamps, 
flashing turn signals, vehicular hazard warning lamps, and school bus warning lamps, 
which projects a beam of light of an intensity greater than 300 candlepower shall be 
so directed that no part of the high intensity portion of the beam will strike level of 
the roadway on which the vehicle stands at a distance of more than 75 feet from the 
vehicle. 
(2) Except as required in Sections 41-6-132 and 41-6-140.10, a person may not drive or 
move any vehicle or equipment upon any highway with any lamp or device capable of 
displaying a red or blue light visible from directly in front of the center of the vehicle. 
(3) Flashing lights are prohibited except as authorized or required in Sections 41-6-90, 41-6-
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121.10, 41-6-130, 41-6-132, 41-6-133, 41-6-140-10, and 41-6-140.20. 
(4) The alternately flashing lights described is Sections 41-6-132 and 41-6-140.10 may not 
be used on any vehicle other than a school bus or an authorized emergency vehicle. The 
rotating light described in Section 41-6-132 may not be used on any vehicle other than an 
authorized emergency vehicle. 
(5) all lighting devices and reflectors mounted on the rear of any vehicle shall display or 
reflect a red color, except the stop light or other signal device, which may be red or yellow, 
and except that the light illuminating the license plate shall be white and the light emitted by 
a back-up lamp shall be white. 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-140 (2001 as amended). 
The Utah Legislature obviously intended this statute to be a regulation on vehicles having 
red or blue colored lights, or flashing lights, any of which have high candle power, and that may be 
mistaken for emergency vehicle lighting. Clearly the statutory intent was to only allow emergency 
vehicles to have red or blue lights that other motorists would recognize as law enforcement or 
emergency vehicles. Because the law requires that vehicles pull over to the side of the road and stop 
for vehicles displaying red and blue lights, it is obviously the intent of this statute to prevent unsworn 
individuals to pass themselves off as law enforcement or emergency personnel by displaying red and 
blue lights, whether solid or flashing, to effectuate stops of other vehicles. Clearly the statute was 
not intended to cover small decorative lights on license plate holders, although such lights may 
technically fall within the statutory prohibition of blue lights that are "visible from directly in front 
of the center of the vehicle." 
Also, this is not a safety violation and, as the Court pointed out in footnote three of State v. 
Galvan, 37 P.3d 1197 (Utah 2001), although it "is a misdemeanor to drive a vehicle with equipment 
not 'in proper condition an adjustment is required by this chapter or rules issued by the department'. 
. . it does not necessarily follow that those rules' would include vehicle inspection standards not 
implicating safety." Id. at 1199 n.3. 
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In this case, the Trooper's testimony was that the violation was an equipment violation and 
not a safety violation. 
Q. (Examination by Mr. Cramer) Okay. What's your general thought - - feeling 
of what that statute's about; emergency vehicles not - - only authorized vehicles to 
have these lights? 
A. (Testimony by Trooper Taylor) They're the only authorized vehic - - ones I 
know of that are authorized to have those lights. 
Q. Right, except for the exceptions that you pointed out. They're in the statute, 
bicycles, buses, those types of things; is that correct? 
A. I don't know about bicycles. 
Q. Oh, okay. I think they just redid it to add bikes in - -
A. Okay. 
Q. - - as I recall. Now, that's not really a safety violation, per se; is that correct? 
A. Safety? It's an equipment violation. 
Q. It's an equipment violation. It's not a safety violation? 
A. It's an equipment violation. 
Q. Correct. In fact, there's no requirement for safety inspection for any front plate 
light at all; is that correct, to your understanding? 
A. I don't do safety inspections. 
(See p. 13 of Transcript of Suppression Hearing, December 20, 2004.) 
Thus, the Trooper stated that the reason he stopped Mr. Karsten was for an equipment 
violation. Although pretext stop challenges have been eliminated, this stop is clearly a Trooper's 
random abuse of power, going beyond any reasonable or logical excuse. 
In fact, the Trooper testified that in his mind the new halogen lights that are seen on the 
highways are not blue nor have a bluish tint. 
Q. (Examination by Mr. Cramer) (Inaudible) I'm going to show you what I've 
identified as Defendant's Exhibit No. 1. Do these lights - - and 1 know it's not the 
same - - it's not the plate of the vehicle. The vehicle's outside, in case the Court 
wants to look at it. Do those look similar to the lights that you observed, as far as not 
the color, but just the shape and the size? 
A. (Trooper Taylor) Like a skull? 
Q. In the skull? 
A. They were plate lights. They were - -1 believe they were skulls. 
Q Okay. 
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A. But they had them out of that. It made a blue light. 
Q. Okay, and now halogen lights also - - in the newer vehicles do the halogen 
headlights have a bluish tint to them also? Have you seen the newer - -
A. They're pure white, in other words? 
Q. Well, I've just seen new cars with halogen lights that have a bluish tint, to me. 
I'm just wondering if they have a bluish tint to you? 
A. Are you wanting me to compare them to these lights? 
Q. No, no. I'm just asking if you've seen them. 
A. They have a - - some people call it a bluish tint. 
Q. Okay. 
A. Or a halo blue. I consider it to be white. 
(See pp. 17-18 of Transcript of Suppression Hearing, December 20, 2004.) 
Clearly, the Trooper decided, having seen the vehicle earlier (Record at 62 page 12 line 10-
15) and having suspicion raised because of Mr. Karsten's appearance, to find some reason to stop 
the vehicle even though no law violations or safety violations had or wrere being committed. This 
type of overreaching is precisely what both the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and Art. 
I, § 14 of the Utah Constitution forbid. 
H. TROOPER TAYLOR'S TERRY FRISK PERFORMED AFTER MR. KARSTEN HAD 
EXITED THE VEHICLE AND STEPPED AWAY FROM THE, VEHICLE VIOLATED MR. 
KARSTEN'S RIGHTS TO BE FREE FROM UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND 
SEIZURES UNDER THE FOURTH AMENDMENT OF THE U.S. CONST. AND ART. I, § 
14 OF THE UTAH CONST. 
The law on Terry frisks is fairly clear. However, factually speaking, there is a broad range 
of possible fact scenarios that make search and seizure cases problematic. However, courts have 
consistently held that "[a] traditional Terry frisk requires that the officer have a reasonable 
articulable suspicion that the suspect was armed and dangerous." State v. Brake, 103 P.3d 699 (Utah 
2004) (emphasis added) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-23 (1968)). Utah's courts have also 
held that "reasonable suspicion requires an objectively reasonable belief that an individual is engaged 
or is about to be engaged in criminal activity." State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 940 (Utah 1994). 
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Clearly under those two cases, the Terry search performed by the Trooper was not 
appropriate. There was a reasonable suspicion that Mr. Karsten was armed, due to the fact that the 
Trooper has observed two knives in Mr. Karsten's vehicle. However, there was no information at 
all that Mr. Karsten was dangerous. In fact, the Trooper himself upon cross-examination indicated 
that Mr. Karsten was compliant and non-aggressive. 
Q. (Examination by Mr. Cramer) And when you asked him to get out of the vehicle 
did he willingly comply? 
A. (Trooper Taylor) Yeah, he got out. 
Q. Okay, and when he got out, did he come at you in an aggressive manner of any 
way? 
A. No, he didn't. 
Q. Okay. Did you see any bulges in his clothing? 
A. I could see there was things in his pockets. 
Q. Okay, but they didn't have a distinction shape of a weapon that you could tell? 
A. Visually? I couldn't see. 
Q. Oh. 
A. I could see bulges in the pocket. 
Q. Okay. Was he belligerent or in any way noncompliant with you when he got out 
of the vehicle? 
A. No, he followed my instructions. 
Q. Okay, and you had him turn around and I guess place his hands on his head? 
A. Basically, yes. 
(See pp. 16-17 of Transcript of Suppression Hearing, December 20, 2004.) 
Thus, the Trooper had no indication that Mr. Karsten had knives in his vehicle, that he was 
engaged in, or was about to be engaged in, any criminal activity. Again, as pointed out in the last 
section of this Brief, the reason the stop was made was not because of a call that Mr. Karsten had 
been involved in any type of violent crime, nor was there even a traffic violation that the Trooper 
observed, but merely small blue lights on Mr. Karsten's front license plate. Therefore, there was no 
criminal activity. There was not even a safety violation. What there was, at most, was an equipment 
violation for which the Trooper wished to cite Mr. Karsten. 
-9-
In State v. Peterson, the Utah Supreme Court held that, cc[c]ourts must apply a two-pronged 
analysis to evaluate whether a warrantless protective search was permissible under Terry. The Court 
must first determine 'whether the officer's action was justified at its inception.' Next, the Court 
must assess whether [the action] was reasomtbly related in scope to the circumstances which justified 
the interference in the first place." 110 P.3d 699 (Utah 2005) (citations and internal quotations 
omitted). 
Under the Peterson analysis, neither prong has been met. As discussed in the prior section 
of this Brief, the Trooper's action was not justified at its inception. Furthermore, the Trooper's Terry 
frisk was not reasonably related in scope to the circumstances because Mr. Karsten was cooperative 
and nonthreatening, and the Trooper had separated Mr. Karsten from access to weapons he saw in 
Mr. Karsten's vehicle. 
In State v. Naranjo, this Court interpreted Terry to mean "that a police officer is permitted 
to 'search' a person that the officer reasonably believes (1) is involved in a crime; (2) is armed; and 
(3) is presently dangerous to the officer, the public, or the person to be searched." 2005 UT App 311 
(Utah App 2005). Indeed, the Naranjo court further observed that "where nothing in the initial 
stages of the encounter serves to dispel [the trooper's] reasonable fear for his own or others' safety, 
he is entitled for the protection of himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully limited search 
of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to 
assault him." Id. 
In this case, the Trooper had no evidence that Mr. Karsten was involved in a crime. He did 
have some evidence that there were weapons in the vehicle. There was no evidence that he was 
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presently dangerous to the Trooper or anyone else. After Mr. Karsten exited his vehicle at the 
Trooper's request, the danger, if any, had passed. 
In State v. Warren, the Utah Supreme Court held that: 
the reasonableness of a Terry frisk is evaluated using an objective standard, but the 
officer's subjective belief may be factored into the objective analysis. We also clarify 
that all traffic stops are inherently dangerous, but the specific dangerousness inherent 
in all traffic stops can be folly or partially mitigated by ordering the person out of the 
vehicle. 
78 P.3d 590 (Utah 2003). 
Here, the Trooper folly mitigated any risks Mr. Karsten may have posed by ordering him out 
of his vehicle and away from his knives. Furthermore, the Trooper testified that Mr. Karsten was 
cooperative. And the Trooper did not testify that he felt that Mr. Karsten posed a threat to his safety. 
In State v. Brake, the Utah Supreme Court held that " a 'weapons search' . . . will be valid only if 
the officer reasonably believes both that the suspect is dangerous, and, that he may obtain immediate 
control of weapons." 2004 UT 95, 103 P.3d 699. Again, there is no evidence in this case that the 
Trooper believed that Mr. Karsten was dangerous. Therefore, the Trooper lacked the necessary bases 
to perform a Terry frisk on Mr. Karsten. 
CONCLUSION 
The evidence presented at the Motion to Suppress was insufficient to seize Mr. Karsten for 
an equipment violation that the Trooper obviously knew was to limit red and blue lights from being 
used by anything other than emergency vehicles and clearly was a pretext for stopping Mr. Karsten 
without probable cause. Once the Trooper had stopped Mr. Karsten and approached the vehicle, he 
observed a knife in the vehicle. At that time, the Trooper did not feel that Mr. Karsten was a danger 
to him or to anyone else and asked Mr. Karsten for standard paperwork for insurance and 
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registration. The Trooper then saw another knife in the vehicle in the area where Mr. Karsten stored 
that paperwork where a visor would normally be located. In order to separate Mr. Karsten from that 
knife and any other knives in the vehicle, he asked Mr. Karsten to get out of the vehicle. Mr. Karsten 
left the vehicle, cooperated with the Trooper, did not threaten the Trooper in any objective or even 
subjective manner and, therefore, should not have been Terry frisked or checked for weapons in 
violation of the U.S. and Utah constitutions. Therefore, the Trial Court should have granted Mr. 
Karsten's Motion to Suppress both the initial stop and the frisk. 
Based on the foregoing, Mr. Karsten asks this Court to find that the Trial Court erred in 
denying his Motion to Suppress, and remand this case to the Trial Courl; with an Order to grant the 
Motion to Suppress. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 1^ day of August, 2005. 
0M&C 
Aric Cramer 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
J. Robert.LatMam 
'Defendant/ Appellant 
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P R O C E E D I N G S 
(Electronically recorded on December 20, 2004) 
THE COURT: 
on Karsten. 
MR. 
suppress. 
THE 
MR. 
THE 
CRAMER 
COURT: 
CRAMER 
COURT: 
the problem here? 
MR. 
two portions 
search. 
no — I 
we have 
on both 
CRAMER 
We're going ahead with the preliminary 
So come on up, Mr. Cramer. 
: Your Honor, I think it' s a motion to 
Oh, pardon me. You're right. 
: Make sure on this note. 
Okay. No good reason to frisk him; is that 
: Well, your Honor, there's two. There's 
There's both the initial stop, and the Terry 
So the two 
THE COURT: 
areas. 
No reasonable suspicion to stop, and then I 
think it's reason -- no good reason -- 1 
MR. 
THE 
MR. 
CRAMER 
COURT: 
CRAMER 
To frisk. 
— to fear the safety, to testify of frisk? 
That's correct. Those are the two issues [ 
before the Court, and what my understanding is. 1 
THE COURT: 
of those. 
MR. 
THE 
MR. 
HALLS: 
COURT: 
HALLS: 
Mr. Halls, I think it will be your burden 
Yes. 
So why don't you proceed. I 
Call Charles Taylor. I 
COURT CLERK: You do solemnly swear that the testimony 
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on 
tha 
MR. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
the 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
all give 
thing but 
in this case will be the truth, the 
the truth, so help you God? 
THE WITNESS: Yes. 
HALLS : 
Please 
CHARLES TAYLOR, 
having been first duly sworn, 
testified as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
state your name and occupation. 
Charles Taylor, Utah Highway Patrol. 
And were you working highway patrolman on 
1st day o f August of 2004? 
I believe it's the 31st. 
The 31 
Yes. 
Okay. 
st
 of July? 
We charged that — all right. Did 
who 
the 
you 
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le truth 
8th — or 
have on 
t occasion an opportunity to come in contact with Brian Ray 
Karsten? 
Mr. 
A. 
Q. 
Yes, I 
Do you 
Karsten in 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
inside 
Yes, I 
Where i 
I was 
of the b< 
did. 
recall the circumstances of your ob 
lis vehicle? 
did. 
were you and what did you see? 
in Bluff, Utah. I was just right th 
asically the town limits, appioximat 
servation of 
ere 
ely 
on the 
milepost 
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]L 24 when I observed his car coming into town. I observed the 
£ vehicle had two blue lights that were emitted forward on the --
3 just right above the license plate area of the vehicle. They 
4 were lit forward. I stopped him for that violation. 
(3 I Q. Okay, and what is that violation? 
6 I A. It's a state code that says you cannot have any red or 
7 blue lights facing forward on your vehicle. 
8 Q. All right. So you stopped Mr. Karsten — do you know 
9 the code number? 
10 A. Yes, I do. It's 41-6-140 paragraph (2). 
11 Q. So what did you do? 
12 I A. At that point I stopped him. I approached the 
13 driver's side. I advised him the reason for the stop was the 
14 blue lights. I asked him for a driver's license, registration, 
15 insurance information. He provided that. I noticed that his 
16 insurance card wasn't correct. I asked him for another 
17 insurance card. 
18 While he was doing that he was moving his hands back 
19 and forth throughout his vehicle, and he was reaching up toward 
20 the visor of the vehicle. So I looked down and looked up now 
21 where his hands were going, and there located in where the 
22 visor is or where the visor should be for this vehicle, there 
23 was a knife, a large knife. Let me show you — I guess I'm not 
24 going to necessarily tape that (inaudible). 
25 Q. Is that the knife? 
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1 | A. That's the knife. 
2 J MR. HALLS: For the purpose of preliminary hearing, 
3 your Honor, rather than take it out of the sack, can we --
4 MR. CRAMER: For purposes of the motion to suppress, I 
5 don't object to that being — 
6 MR. HALLS: Observed by the Court? 
7 MR. CRAMER: — observed by the Court, no. 
8 Q. BY MR. HALLS: All right. So there's other stuff here, 
9 and we're not going to really go with that, but so this is the 
10 knife that you saw on the visor? 
11 A. Right here, that's right. 
12 Q. The condition of the visor — 
13 A. Basically the inside of this car had no interior. 
14 I It just had metal. You could see the roof. It was wedged 
15 in where the sheet metal is. It's concealed up there. His 
16 paperwork was right along with It, right where his hands were 
17 going to go for that knife. At that point I decided I needed 
18 I to -- I removed him from the vehicle. 
19 Q. Okay. Did you have — were there any other officers 
20 there at that time? 
21 A. Yes, Officer — or Deputy John Laws was there with me 
22 also. 
23 Q. Was there any conversation or interchange between you 
2 4 and the other officer or anybody else at the scene? 
2 5 A. As I pulled him out of the car, I told Officer Laws 
1 that I could see a knife. He told me he could also see a 
? knife. 
$ I Q. Same knife? 
4 A. I didn't see how he could see the same knife in the 
$ I position where I was. It was right above the driver. So I 
6 assumed it was another knife. I also on my approach to the 
7 vehicle had already seen one knife in the back seat. Pulled 
8 him out, distanced him from the knife so he couldn' t access 
9 I that with me there, and where there were so many other knifes, 
10 I decided to Terry frisk him to be sure there were no other 
11 knifes on the subject. 
12 I Q. Okay, and then so what did you do? 
13 A. I then conducted a Terry frisk. I immediately upon 
14 touching his left front pocket, I recognized what was 
15 consistent with a drug pipe, a glass pipe with a bowl on it. 
16 Q. Do you have that pipe? 
17 A. It's in that box. 
16 I Q. Okay. Are you talking about the one on the top? 
19 A. That's the white -- yes, with the black (inaudible), 
2 0 yes. 
21 MR. HALLS: Do you have any objection to the Court 
22 seeing that? 
23 MR. CRAMER: No, sir. 
24 Q. BY MR. HALLS: So I want to explore for just a moment 
25 what you said. Something consistent. When you felt it, did 
you fee 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
j to the 
the one 
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1 you knew what it was? 
Yes, I did. 
What did you feel it was? 
A pipe, a meth pipe. 
And this is the item that you felt? 
Yes. 
MR. HALLS: Your Honor, Counsel did not have objection 
Court observing the pipe. There's two there, but that's 
I'm talking about. 
THE WITNESS: (Inaudible). 
Q. BY MR. HALLS: All right. So what did you do? 
A. I then took Mr. Karsten, moved him against his trunk, 
and told him I was putting handcuffs on him. I secured him and 
told him I was going to remove the pipe from his pocket. 
Q. Did he say anything about the pipe when you said that? 
A. He didn't object to it. I placed him into cuffs, and 
I removed the pipe from his pocket. 
Q. Did you find any other weapons or anything on his 
person? 
A. I didn't find any weapons on his person, no. 
Q. Any other items in his pockets? 
A. Yes, I did. 
Q. What else? 
A. Well, after cuffing him and pulled the pipe out, I 
Mirandized him. I pulled out a small brown bottle. If I can 
-9-
$. I refer to my report, I believe it was his right front pocket. 
£ I removed a small glass bottle and asked him what was in it. 
S He identified it as cocaine in that. Also in his front pocket 
4 I found a small tin — little tin box, opened it up, and he 
5 identified the contents of that to be methamphetamine. 
6 Q. All right, Officer. Going back to the other threshold 
7 items, your — well, anything else you want to add with regard 
8 to the purpose for the stop? It was strictly the blue lights? 
9 A. The blue lights. 
10 I Q. And that is a violation of equipment? 
11 A. It's an equipment violation. The only vehicles 
12 allowed to have blue or red lights forward is an emergency 
13 vehicle. I believe that's in 132 of that same section, and 
14 the others that are allowed to have a flashing light or a red 
15 light is a bus, a school bus, which is in 140.10 of that same 
16 section. 
17 Q. All right, and then with regard getting him out of the 
18 car and frisking him is because you observed the knifes where 
19 he had his hands, and the other — as you got him out, the 
20 other officer indicated he could also see knifes? 
21 A. Yeah. For my safety I confirmed he had no other 
22 weapon on him, other than the weapons that were in the car. 
23 I had him away from that. I secured to make sure I was safe in 
24 that by doing the Terry frisk. 
25 Q. Have you ever seen a knife like that used for ordinary 
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1 1 purposes (inaudible)? 
2 I A. I've never seen a knife like this, other than it 
3 looks like to me an assault type weapon. It's meant to be 
4 gripped, and I've never seen a weapon -- a knife like that 
5 J in a concealment place where it was. All I could figure it 
was for was to ward off someone, more of an assault type 
weapon. 
MR. HALLS: That's all I have. 
9 I CROSS EXAMINATION 
10 BY MR. CRAMER: 
11 Q. Trooper Taylor, just a couple questions prior to this 
12 stop. Now, did you have your mobile video recording equipment 
13 working that day? 
14 A. I had run out of tape prior to this stop. 
15 Q. And so you didn't have the number of tapes in the 
16 vehicle that your operating policy requires that you have? 
17 A. I did not have another tape, no. 
18 J Q. Okay. Now, prior to this stop outside, then, where 
19 I were you — did you see this car earlier in the day? 
20 A. I don't recall seeing it, no. 
21 Q. Do you recall being in Mexican Hat a few hours before 
22 this --
23 A. Yes, yeah. 
24 Q. — running radar? 
25 A. I did. 
- 1 1 -
1 I Q. Okay. Did you see that vehicle at that time; do you 
2 recall? 
3 I A. I recall a red GTO, or a car similar to that one. I 
4 don't know if it was the same one. I didn't stop it. 
5 Q. So this isn't a truck, as you earlier identified it. 
6 It's a vehic -- a car? 
7 A. I identified it as a truck. 
8 I Q. You said you put him — when you went to arrest him 
9 you put him up against the truck. Were you driving a truck? 
10 A. Trunk. 
11 Q. Oh, trunk, I'm sorry. I misheard. My bad — I'm 
12 sorry. So you saw this vehicle as a x68 GTO, just for 
13 identification purposes? I don't know if you know the year. 
14 I A. It is a %68, according to the report. 
15 Q. Okay, all right. To your — that's what I'm going 
16 off, is your report. 
17 A. Uh-huh. 
18 Q. So you may have seen this vehicle earlier in the day? 
19 A. Yup. 
20 Q. Okay, in Mexican Hat, and then driving towards 
21 Monticello was the direction of the vehicle when you saw it and 
22 saw the blue lights; is that correct? 
23 A. The vehicle was driving towards Monticello? 
24 Q. Yeah. Is that correct? 
25 I A. It was coming into Bluff, northbound on US-91. 
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Q. 
prior 
A. 
Q. 
going 
A. 
Q-
Okay, and had you seen it in your rearview 
to that? 
Not that I recall. 
Do you recall turning around and following 
the opposite direction? 
Yes, I do. 
Okay, and then you saw this vehicle coming, 
you turned and followed it — 
A. 
Q. 
Yes. 
— and stopped it. Okay. You donrt recall 
Mr. Karsten in Mexican Hat prior to this, though? 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
A. 
Q. 
today, 
I recall the car earlier that day. 
Okay. 
That's about it. 
Fine. 
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mirror 
a truck 
and then 
. seeing 
Now, according to your report and your testimony 
essentially this statute is the — well, I gu 
j a statute. The statute is the reason for the stop. 
no driving pattern, per se; is that correct? 
A. 
Q. 
that s 
No, there was not. 
Now, this statute really is -- in subparagr 
tatute, you sound like you're fairly familiar 
that talks about lamps; is that correct? 
A. 
Q
' 
(Inaudible)? I believe so. 
Blue and red lamps? 
ess it is 1 
There was ] 
aph (1) of 
with it, I 
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1 A. I'm not 100 percent word-for-word on that. 
2 I Q. Okay. What's your general thought -- feeling of what 
3 that statute's about; emergency vehicles not -- only authorized 
4 vehicles to have these lights? 
5 I A. They're the only authorized vehic -- ones I know of 
6 I that are authorized to have those lights. 
7 Q. Right, except for the exceptions that you pointed out. 
8 They're in the statute, bicycles, buses, those types of things; 
9 is that correct? 
10 A. I don't know about bicycles. 
11 Q. Oh, okay. I think they just redid it to add bikes 
12 in — 
13 A. Okay. 
14 Q. — as I recall. Now, that's not really a safety 
15 I violation, per se; is that correct? 
16 A. Safety? It's an equipment violation. 
17 Q. It's an equipment violation. It's not a safety 
18 I violation? 
19 A. It's an equipment violation. 
2 0 Q. Correct. In fact, there's no requirement for safety 
21 inspection for any front plate light at all; is that correct, 
22 to your understanding? 
23 A. I don't do safety inspections. 
24 I Q. Okay. Let's go to at the driver contact session of 
2 5 where we're at in this incident. As you approached the vehicle 
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1 and asked Mr. Karsten for his license and registration did he 
2 — was he cooperative with you? 
3 A. Yes. 
4 Q. Did he indicate any hostility or aggression towards 
5 you? 
6 A. No. 
7 Q. And he complied and gave you the documents that you 
8 asked for at that time; is that correct? 
9 A. All except for a valid insurance caret. 
10 Q. Right, and then when you asked him for that, he was 
11 I attempting to find that document; is that correct? 
12 A. That's true. 
13 Q. Okay. Now, you indicated in — you recall filling out 
14 a report on this incident shortly after the incident; is that 
15 correct? 
16 A. Yeah. 
17 Q. And y o u ' r e us ing t h a t for - - t o r e f r e s h your memory 
18 about the inc idence? 
1 9 A. Yes . 
20 Q. For your testimony today. Now, do you recall that as 
21 you were talking to him about this, you indicated in your 
22 report you saw a knife on the floor on the driver's side in the 
23 back seat? 
24 A. On my approach, yes. 
25 Q. On your approach. You saw a knife at that point? 
-15-
1 I A. Yes, right. 
2 Q. And you didn't remove him from the vehicle at that 
3 point? 
4 A. It' s in the back seat behind him. 
5 Q. Okay. So you didn't remove them at that time? 
6 A. No, I did not. 
7 Q. Okay, and then later after you arrested him, you also 
8 I found a gun — 
9 A. Yes. 
10 Q. — on the back seat, directly behind the driver; is 
11 that correct? 
12 A. It was. 
13 I Q. And that's the gun that's before the Court right now? 
14 A. No? 
15 Q. No. It's a different — 
16 A. That's not the gun. 
17 Q. That's not the gun that you took? 
18 I A. It's a magazine with bullets. 
19 Q. Oh, I'm sorry, I -- but you did receive a -- you did 
2 0 take the gun that was in the back seat? 
21 A. Yes, I did. 
22 I Q. Okay. Now, you indicated that when he pulled the 
23 visor down -- is that correct, did you pull it down? 
24 A. There was no visor. 
25 I Q. There was no visor. There was just --
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There was no visor. It's a visor area. Like I said, 
the interior of this car is basically -- it' s like he' s 
restoring it. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
I that met 
A. 
Q. 
Right. 
And this is missing. 
Okay, and so there were documents also tucked up in 
al space? 
Uh-huh. 
And when you asked him to get out of the vehicle did 
he willingly comply? 
A. 
Q. 
Yeah, he got out. 
Okay, and when he got out, did he come at you in an 
aggressive manner of any way? 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
No, he didn't. 
Okay. Did you see any bulges in his clothing? 
I could see there was things in his pockets. 
Okay, but they didn't have a distinction shape of a 
weapon that you could tell? 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
with you 
A. 
Q. 
Visually? I couldn't see. 
Oh. 
I could see bulges in the pocket. 
Okay. Was he belligerent or in any way noncompliant 
when he got out of the vehicle? 
No, he followed my instructions. 
Okay, and you had him turn around and I guess place 
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1 his hands on his head? 
2 A. Basically, yes. 
3 Q. And then you indicated that as you patted him down, 
4 you could tell through his pants that it was a pipe; is that 
5 correct? 
6 A. Yes. 
7 Q. You've also indicated later you took both urine and 
8 blood samples from Mr. Karsten; is that correct? 
9 A. I did do that, yes. 
10 Q. Okay. 
11 A. It's in the report. 
12 MR. HALLS: Your Honor, this goes beyond the scope of 
13 the stop and the frisk. 
14 THE COURT: It does seem to be expanding it. 
15 MR. CRAMER: All right, your Honor. That's fine. 
16 Q. BY MR. CRAMER: Now, referring back to the lights, I'm 
17 going to show you what I'm going to call Defendant's Exhibit 
18 No. 1. I know — and I'll get to the foundation of that. 
19 I MR. CRAMER: May I approach the witness, your Honor? 
20 THE COURT: You may. 
21 J Q. BY MR. CRAMER: (Inaudible) I'm going to show you what 
22 I've identified as Defendant's Exhibit No. 1. Do these lights 
23 — and I know it's not the same — it's not the plate of the 
24 vehicle. The vehicle's outside, in case the Court wants to 
25 look at it. Do those look similar to the lights that you 
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1 observed, as far as not the color, but just the shape and the 
2 size? 
3 A. Like a skull? 
4 Q. In the skull? 
5 A. They were plate lights. They were -- I believe they 
6 were skulls. 
7 Q. Okay. 
8 A. But they had them out of that. It made a blue light. 
9 Q. Okay, and now halogen lights also — in the newer 
10 vehicles do the halogen headlights have a bluish tint to them 
11 also? Have you seen the newer — 
12 A. They're pure white, in other words? 
13 Q. Well, I've just seen new cars with halogen lights that 
14 have a bluish tint, to me. I'm just wondering if they have a 
15 bluish tint to you? 
16 A. Are you wanting me to compare them to these lights? 
17 Q. No, no. I'm just asking if you've seen them. 
18 A. They have a — some people call it a bluish tint. 
19 Q. Okay. 
20 A. Or a halo blue. I consider it to be white. 
21 MR. CRAMER: Okay. That's all the questions I have for 
22 the trooper on cross, your Honor. 
2 3 MR. HALLS: Nothing else. Nothing else on those items, 
24 your Honor. 
25 THE COURT: All right, thank you. You can step down. 
-19-
1 THE WITNESS: Do you want me to take these, your Honor, 
2 with me? 
3 THE COURT: Yes. 
4 I MR. HALLS: Your Honor, we -- just contemplating just 
5 what we have on the record, contemplating if the Court does not 
6 grant the motion to suppress and this is appealed, if they need 
7 to take a look at those exhibits, we would be able to put these 
8 exhibits in, and yours also? 
9 I MR. CRAMER: Yes, I would have no objection, and 
10 anticipate part of the record. 
11 I MR. HALLS: Do you want him to take them or shall we 
12 keep them? 
13 MR. CRAMER: I'm going to have to lay a foundation to 
14 have those brought in, I'm sure. 
15 MR. HALLS: (Inaudible). 
16 MR. CRAMER: Your Honor, I'd like to call Mr. Karsten 
17 to the stand for a few questions. 
18 COURT CLERK: Raise your right hand. You do solemnly 
19 swear that the testimony you shall give in this case shall be 
20 the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help 
21 you God? 
2 2 THE WITNESS: Y e s . 
2 3 BRIAN KARSTEN, 
2 4 I h a v i n g been f i r s t d u l y s w o r n , 
2 5 t e s t i f i e d as f o l l o w s : 
-20-
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. CRAMER: 
Q-
I for the 
A. 
Q. 
correct? 
A. 
Q. 
Mr. Karsten, would you state your name and spell it 
record, please. 
Brian Ray Karsten, K-a-r-s-t-e-n. 
And you're the defendant in this case; is that 
Yes . 
All right. I'd like to show you what has been 
introduce — or just mentioned as Defendant's Exhibit No. 1. 
Could you identify that for me? 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q 
purchase 
A. 
Q. 
plate li 
A. 
Q. 
the same 
A. 
Q
* 
today? 
They're license plate lights or bracket holders. 
Did you purchase those lights? 
Yes. 
And have they been in your possession since you I 
d them? 
Yes. 
Are they — and what way are the like the license 1 
ghts that are on the vehicle that you own, the x68 -- I 
They're identical. J 
Did you get them -- the ones that are on the car at I 
store? 1 
Yes. 
And your vehicle — the vehicle in question is here 1 
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1 I A. Yes, it is. 
2 Q. And those lights, tell me how they appear, in your 
3 perception, when they're illuminated. 
4 A. They're more or less accent lights. They're just for 
5 show. They're just little eyeballs in the skulls. 
6 Q. That light up? 
7 A. They're not really bright or anything. They're just 
8 for show and tell. 
9 MR. CRAMER: Your Honor, at this time I would move for 
10 the introduction of Defendant's Exhibit No. 1. 
11 MR. HALLS: No objection. 
12 THE COURT: Exhibit 1 is received. 
13 (Exhibit No. 1 received into evidence) 
14 MR. CRAMER: That's all the questions I have of 
15 Mr. Karsten, your Honor. 
16 MR. HALLS: Do we have any lighting? I just wanted to 
17 see — 
18 COURT CLERK: (Inaudible). 
19 MR. HALLS: Can I see it? 
20 THE COURT: I wanted to see it first. 
21 MR. HALLS: Okay. 
22 I THE COURT: Any other questions you want to ask him 
23 about that? 
24 MR. HALLS: I do. 
25 /// 
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1 CROSS EXAMINATION 
2 BY MR. HALLS: 
3 I Q. Mr. Karsten, when you observed the. lights from your 
4 license plate as they were installed on the car and as they 
5 were operating? 
6 A. How is that? 
7 Q. The ones — the lights that are on your car that are 
8 similar to this — 
9 A. Right. 
10 Q. You've looked — you've seen them when they're lit? 
11 A. Yeah. 
12 Q. Are they blue? 
13 A. They're bluish purple, yeah. 
14 Q. Okay, and they were for people to see on the front of 
15 the vehicle? This was on the front plate? 
16 A. Yes, on the front. I don't know how other people can 
17 see them driving down the road, but I can see them if you're 
18 standing in front of the car, yeah. 
19 MR. HALLS: Sometimes there's a car in front of — can 
20 I just see the writing, your Honor, as you're looking at that. 
21 THE COURT: You'll have to hook them up for them to be 
22 lit, though. 
23 MR. HALLS: Right. 
24 THE COURT: So you can run this wire to your battery? 
25 MR. HALLS: Yes,. It's on a show car. (Inaudible). 
-23-
1 Q. BY MR. HALLS: (Inaudible)? 
2 A. (Inaudible). 
3 Q. Could you read the warning right here for me? 
4 A. "Warning." It says, "Use of this product to motor 
5 vehicles may be restricted by certain laws or regulations. 
6 This product is intended for (inaudible) and — " what does it 
7 say? I guess I need glasses. 
8 Q. Says illegal — it might be illegal to use that. 
9 THE COURT: Why don't you just let me read it, 
10 Mr. Halls. 
11 MR. HALLS: I have nothing further, your Honor. 
12 THE COURT: Anything else, Mr. Cramer? 
13 MR. CRAMER: Nothing further, your Honor. 
14 THE COURT: You can step down. Thanks. Is that all 
15 your evidence, Mr. Cramer? 
16 MR. CRAMER: No, your Honor. As I indicated to the 
17 Court, if the Court is interested, the vehicle is outside. 
18 The lights are -- I had him -- he reattached them so they could 
19 be illuminated if the Court wanted to see them. I know it's 
2 0 daytime. It's not nighttime, but in case the Court needs to 
21 look at that, we would submit the vehicle into evidence. 
22 I THE COURT: Are you going to be claiming that you 
23 wouldn't be able to see these lights — 
24 MR. CRAMER: No, your Honor. 
25 THE COURT: — from the point from directly in front of 
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tjie center of the vehicle? 
MR. CRAMER 
THE COURT: 
Mr. Halls, 
MR. HALLS: 
THE COURT: 
: No, your Honor. 
Okay. Then I won't wait until tonight. 
any rebuttal? 
No, your Honor. 
I'll give you five minutes for your closing 
argument, Mr. Cramer. 
MR. CRAMER: Your Honor, I would point the Court just 
to a few cases. The first one I would point the Court to is 
State vs. Galvin. It's a case 37 P. 3d 1197, Utah Court of 
Appeals. 
There the case was an issue as to whether a trooper 
seeing a sparkle in a windshield would be able to stop the 
vehicle without essentially being able to measure that 24 
inches of crack that would make it a safety violation. 
As I indicated to the Court, we're not saying that 
the lights couldn't be seen. Obviously I think the trooper 
saw them. They are lights. They were illuminated. It was 
9 o'clock at night. 
The wording, however, in the footnote in the case, 
I think what are important. Paragraph 7, Defendant was cited 
for an equipment violation under either Section 41-6-117 or 
41-6-155. Both sections concern driving unsafe vehicles. Both 
parties rely on the State vehicle inspection standards as the 
basis for equipment violation. They don't agree on what the 
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1 J correct standard is. 
2 The Court goes on to say that the administrative codes 
3 are replaced by the inspection manual for vehicle windshield 
4 cracks, and they go on to talk whether or not the sparkle could 
5 J have been a safety violation. 
Most importantly, I think, is the footnote 3, where 
the Court says, "Initially we find it troubling that both the 
State and defendant assume that the administrative regulations 
9 I for vehicle inspections create a per se proper basis for an 
10 administrative stop." 
11 While section — excuse me. They cite the two cases 
12 where an officer stopped a car for a wobbly front wheel or for 
13 a turn signal that had been on for two miles as the officer 
14 followed it. Both of these stops, however, were directly 
15 related to the safety of the vehicle. Courts consistently 
16 hold that a police officer can stop a vehicle when he or she 
17 believes a vehicle's safety equipment is not functioning 
18 properly. 
19 While Section 41-6-117 does state that it is a 
20 misdemeanor to drive a vehicle with equipment not in proper 
21 condition and adjustment required in this chapter or rules 
22 issued by this department, it does not necessarily follow that 
23 those rules would include vehicle inspection standards not 
24 implicating safety. We don't need to reach this issue, as it's 
2 5 not before us. We reverse on other grounds. 
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1 I So I would submit to the Court that this statute that 
2 we've been talking about is -- it's there, and subsection (2), 
3 I it qualifies under subsection (2), but it's not a safety issue. 
4 I don't think that a non-safety traffic violation is sufficient 
5 to give probable cause to stop a vehicle. 
6 There is no indication that anyone — and I think it 
7 I could be argued that no one's going to mistake these lights for 
an emergency vehicle. They weren't flashing. The trooper 
9 didn't observe a flashing or wigwag type of lighting. It's a 
10 I technical violation, but it's not a safety violation. 
11 THE COURT: Well, in Galvin we were talking about 
12 I bootstrapping an administrative regulation through a safety 
13 statute, and there's a question about whether an administrative 
14 regulation really had to do with safety at all, but this — 
15 but we're not talking about administrative regulation. We're 
16 talking about statutes. 
17 MR. CRAMER: That's correct, your Honor. It is a 
18 statute, but what I'm saying is that I think the Court in the 
19 footnote says that it's not an automatic just because --
2 0 THE COURT: You would read --
21 MR. CRAMER: — there's a — 
22 THE COURT: You would read the footnote extending 
23 scrutiny to the statutes? 
24 MR. CRAMER: I would, your Honor, because it doesn't 
25 — I think that they're talking about the difference between 
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1 safety and non-safety issues, and I think that's where the 
2 differentiation can be made. 
3 THE COURT: I'm not going to — I'm not going to go 
4 there. 
5 MR. CRAMER: Okay. 
6 THE COURT: Let's move onto the other argument. 
7 MR. CRAMER: All right. Your Honor, the other argument, 
8 the second issue is the Terry frisk. I think that the facts 
9 I are fairly clear that the trooper saw a knife on the ground 
10 behind Mr. Karsten, on the floor behind him. Trooper didn't 
11 feel he could reach it, but he did see a knife there. However, 
12 he didn't pull him out of the vehicle at that time. 
13 Mr. Karsten gave no indication that he was going to be 
14 uncooperative, that he was going to attack the officer or that 
15 he was dangerous. He saw the -- the trooper saw the knife 
16 tucked into the space between the metal where it's tucked in 
17 with some other papers. There's no indication that Mr. Karsten 
18 was reaching for the knife to attack the trooper. 
19 A knife is a knife, and you've seen knifes. It's an 
20 interesting looking knife, but I don't think that there's any 
21 indication that this knife is specifically just for killing 
22 troopers. It's a knife. It's a dangerous weapon. Doesn't 
23 matter if it's a butter knife or a bayonet. It's a dangerous 
24 weapon. 
25 The trooper did the right thing. He asked him to step 
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1 out of the vehicle to get away from that knife, plus the other 
2 knife, plus the gun that he discovered later. 
3 However, as he stepped out of the vehicle, as the 
4 Court has indicated both in Warren and in Hechble and in Brake, 
5 there's a multitude of tests there, and all of those cases of 
6 course are different on the facts because there weren't weapons 
7 there. This is a case where there are weapons. So it's a 
8 little bit different. 
9 If the Court has stated in Warren, that if a person 
10 is ordered out of the vehicle, some or all of the inherent 
11 dangerousness of a traffic stop may be mitigated, then you 
12 look to the rest of the factors. It's an objective test, 
13 with the officer's subjective state of mind to be factored in. 
14 The reasonableness, quoting out of Warren, is 
15 supported. They gave what was supporting the frisk and then 
16 what wasn't supporting it. In using that same kind of analysis 
17 I think that the supporting the frisk is the fact that this 
18 was at night. Deserted area of road, moderately deserted, 
19 compared to 1-15. I mean, it's not a major highway, and that 
2 0 the trooper --
21 THE COURT: I forgot where it was. 
22 MR. HALLS: Just outside of milepost 24, right on the 
23 edge of Bluff, I think. 
24 THE COURT: Milepost 24 would be this side of Bluff? 
25 MR. HALLS: (Inaudible) just about a block — 
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1 1 I think the factors that would weigh against the 
2 I Terry search would be the lack of aggression by Mr. Carson, 
3 his cooperativeness. There was no sudden lunging, no loud, 
4 boisterous behavior, no indication that he was at any point 
5 not cooperating or obeying the trooper. The fact that when the 
6 trooper got him out of the vehicle, he was then at that point 
7 away from the weapons. 
8 So the inherently dangerous part of all traffic stops, 
9 I as was pointed out in Warren, would have been mitigated by him 
10 leaving the vehicle and cooperating with the trooper there. 
11 I think that that same analysis is used in Hechtle. 
12 That case is a little bit different than this. That just goes 
13 to the fact that the trooper didn't stop — in the Hechtle 
14 case — him for a DUI metabolite. That's what happened here. 
15 That's not why he was originally stopped. He was stopped for 
16 speeding in Hechtle. Here we're stopped because of a violation 
17 of a statute, and there the trooper just did a pat down for 
18 officer safety. 
19 Again, the differences there as to here are what the 
20 person was stopped for; speeding versus here, where there's no 
21 indication of drug use in the stop. A standard stop where the 
22 trooper saw some weapons in the back seat and a weapon within 
23 arm's reach of Mr. Karsten at the time. 
24 Therefore, I think that those cases all follow, and 
25 unless the Court has any other questions -- I think I'm over my 
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1 I five minutes, but I think that that's the analysis. 
2 THE COURT: All right, thank you. 
3 MR. CRAMER: Thank you, your Honor. 
4 THE COURT: Mr. Halls, I'm going to give you a chance 
5 to put anything on the record that you think needs to be on the 
6 record, but I know what I should do here. I'm going to deny 
7 the motion to suppress. 
o I have read what I think are the operative, pertinent 
9 portions in each of the four cases that Mr. Cramer has given 
10 me; State vs. Galvin, 37 P.3d 1197; State vs. Brake, which is 
11 2004 Utah 95; State vs. Hechtle, 89 P.3d 185; State vs. Warren, 
12 78 P.3d 590. 
13 I think the initial stop was proper. Seems like 
14 therewas a violation -- I'm confident there was a violation 
15 observed of 41-6-140 subparagraph (2). It may not be the most 
16 momentous problem in the code, but still I think it's within 
17 the legitimate authority of the legislature to prohibit those 
18 kinds of lights. So he had the right to stop him. 
19 Having observed two knifes, and the one knife I saw is 
2 0 more than a pocketknife, creates considerably more concern than 
21 a pocketknife. This is not a case, like some of the cases that 
22 were cited, where we're talking about going back and searching 
2 3 a vehicle after removing the occupant from the vehicle. 
2 4 This is a case where we're just talking about frisking 
25 J the occupant, and I think that's a case where there's less 
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1 impact. It's more focused on the real risk. You can't say 
2 when somebody's out of the car that if they've got a weapon on 
3 their person that they can't get to that. They certainly can. 
4 To me, given that you'd already seen two knifes, it 
5 was reasonable to be concerned that this individual had another 
6 knife, that should he choose to resist the police, might be 
7 used by him for that purpose. In a place like Bluff, on the 
8 outskirts of Bluff, you wouldn't count on there being any 
9 public notice or to dissuade that individual. 
10 Now, this is a difficult area, I think, for the 
11 Courts, because I think they're reluctant to say everybody 
12 you stop, you can frisk. Yet if you have to be 50 percent 
13 I certain, there has to be a 50/50 chance this guy's going to 
14 pull a knife on you and stab you before you can actually check 
15 for it, then we're going to lose 50 percent of the officers in 
16 these circumstances. 
17 I don't think that's the standard. I think it has 
18 to be a standard that allows officers to protect themselves 
19 at lower levels of risk than that. So I haven't seen a case 
20 specifically on point. 
21 I suppose — well, I know that I'll be subject to 
22 correction if I'm wrong about this, but I think it would be a 
23 terrible mistake and expose law officers to unwarranted danger 
24 to prohibit them from frisking under these circumstances. He's 
25 I seen two knifes in the vehicle. I think he has the right to 
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1 check to make sure this individual doesn't have another one in 
2 his pocket. I hope he would. If it were anyone that I care 
3 about who's a law enforcement officer, I would desperately hope 
4 that he can do that for his own safety, or her own safety. 
5 MR. HALLS: Your Honor, just — 
6 THE COURT: You can put on the record what you want to, 
7 in case, you know, there would be any question about whether 
8 you made an argument or not, Mr. Halls. 
9 MR. HALLS: Two other minor things for the record would 
10 be, your Honor, that the actual character of the knife, the 
11 officer said he recognized it as being more of an assault knife 
12 than any kind of utility knife, or functional or any other kind 
13 of a — 
14 THE COURT: Looks kind of like a small cling on knife. 
15 I MR. HALLS: It has like a brass knuckle component to 
16 it, and it's got serrated edge on the top and it' s sharp on 
17 the bottom. So he said he noticed that about the knife as it 
18 was there. 
19 The second thing he noticed before he did the — 
20 another thing that he noticed before doing the frisk was the 
21 other officer said -- he said, "I can see a knife," and got him 
22 out. The other officer said, "I can also see knifes." 
23 So there were another indication from the other 
24 officer there were other knifes that could be seen, besides 
25 the one that he was observing. I think that gives another 
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1 component to believe that the officer wants to determine 
2 whether there may be additional weapons on this person. So 
3 those two items I would — 
4 THE COURT: All right, thank you. I denied the motion 
5 to suppress. I think I've made findings. We're on schedule 
6 for trial on January 6th, right? 
7 MR. CRAMER: Your Honor, if we could pass this motion. 
8 I've talked to Counsel about this, and perhaps, you know, talk 
9 to my client about it, I think what we'd like to do is take a 
10 break, and perhaps we can resolve it. I don't anticipate it 
11 going to trial in two weeks, but if we could pass this matter 
12 I while the Court takes another matter, if we could revisit it, 
13 we may be able to resolve it today. 
14 THE COURT: That's just fine. 
15 (Court addresses other matter unrelated to this case) 
16 THE COURT: Back, then, to State of Utah vs. Brian Ray 
17 Karsten. It's 0417-88. 
18 MR. CRAMER: Your Honor, may it please the Court, we've 
19 reached a resolution in this case, and we appreciate the Court 
2 0 giving us time to work it out. It's anticipated that there 
21 will be a change of plea that will be entered today. The 
22 nature of that plea is as follows. 
2 3 Mr. Karsten will change his plea frcm not guilty to 
24 guilty on Counts I and IV. The State would move to amend Count 
2 5 I II to a Class A, attempt, to which the defendant would change 
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1 I his plea from not guilty to guilty on that count. Count III 
2 would be dismissed. 
3 So essentially we would have a third-degree felony on 
4 Count I he would plead guilty to. Count II would be a Class A, 
5 attempted, to which he would plead guilty to. Count III, the 
6 paraphernalia would be dismissed. Count IV, Class B, driving 
7 under the influence metabolite, he would plead guilty to that. 
8 THE COURT: Do you have a defendant's statement? 
9 MR. CRAMER: I do, your Honor. 
10 THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Karsten, come on up to the 
11 lectern with your attorney. 
12 MR. CRAMER: The other — the other things I would like 
13 to indicate to the Court, your Honor, is that he is reserving 
14 his right to appeal the motion to suppress denial under Seary, 
15 and we would request a presentence report. 
16 I would request the Court — if the Court wishes 
17 me to prepare the order and findings, I can, or however the 
18 Court normally does that. That's the entire agreement as I 
19 understand it. 
20 THE COURT: Has he signed the defendant's statement? 
21 MR. CRAMER: No, he's read it, and he's prepared to 
22 sign it in open Court. I've signed it, and so has Counsel for 
23 the State, but I — it's my — 
24 THE COURT: (Inaudible) to me that he signs it now. 
25 MR. CRAMER: Okay. 
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1 I {Defendant signing statement) 
2 MR. CRAMER: He has signed it, your Hoior. May I 
3 I approach? 
4 THE COURT: You may. Mr. Karsten, did you read this? 
5 MR. KARSTEN: Yes. 
6 THE COURT: Did you understand it? 
7 MR. KARSTEN: Yes. 
8 THE COURT: E)id you sign it? 
9 MR. KARSTEN: Yes. 
10 THE COURT: I had on July 31st, 2004 in my pocket small 
11 amounts of cocaine and methamphetamine. I was driving a 
12 I vehicle with a blood/amphetamine level of .06 micrograms per 
13 milliliter.,, Is that true? 
14 MR. KARSTEN: Yes. 
15 THE COURT: Other than the State allowing you to 
16 reserve your right to appeal the denial of your motion to 
17 suppress, has the State promised you anything else with regard 
18 to what the sentence will be recommended? 
19 MR. KARSTEN: No. 
20 THE COURT: Do you understand that you do face the 
21 possibility of a zero to five sentence in the Utah State 
22 Prison, followed by one year and six months in the Grand --
23 or in the San Juan County Jail? 
24 MR. KARSTEN: Yes. 
25 THE COURT: What sentence I impose will be my decision 
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1 and I'm not bound by what anyone else has promised you. Do you 
2 understand that? 
3 MR. KARSTEN: Yes. 
4 THE COURT: Are you acting of your own free will? 
5 MR. KARSTEN: Yeah, I am. 
6 THE COURT: Do you have any questions? 
7 MR. KARSTEN: No. 
8 THE COURT: The charge of possession of methamphetamine 
9 a third-degree felony, what plea do you enter? 
10 MR. KARSTEN: Guilty. 
11 THE COURT: The charge of attempted possession of 
12 cocaine, a Class A misdemeanor, what plea do you enter? 
13 MR. KARSTEN: Guilty. 
14 THE COURT: To the charge of possession of drug 
15 paraphernalia, a Class B misdemeanor — excuse me, the charge 
16 of driving with drugs in your system, a Class B misdemeanor, 
17 what plea do you enter? 
18 MR. KARSTEN: Guilty. 
19 THE COURT: I find that the defendant is aware of 
2 0 his legal and Constitutional Rights, and that he has knowingly 
21 and voluntarily waived those rights, and tendered these pleas, 
22 order that the pleas be entered. Count III is dismissed 
23 I pursuant to the plea agreement. 
24 Because it's likely that had I granted the motion to 
2 5 suppress, the State would be unable to proceed on all of the 
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1 charges, I believe it's in the best interest of judgment — 
2 justice and judicial economy that the defendant be permitted 
3 to reserve his right to appeal the denial of his motion to 
4 suppress. That's the only thing he's reserving. Of course, 
5 he can reserve the right to appeal as well, as everyone does. 
6 Mr. Cramer, I'd be happy to sign an order if you want 
7 to put it in to make this clear. We've had a few cases where 
8 the appellate Courts didn't think we made it clear. 
9 MR. CRAMER: Well, and that's my concern, your Honor, 
10 is just in reading the reports as they come out, it seems that 
11 they want a written order to appeal from, and I didn't want it 
12 to be off of a minute entry, and then they say, "Well, you had 
13 a problem with your timing." So if the Court would allow me to 
14 prepare an order, I will prepare one. 
15 THE COURT: It would probably be good to just sign that 
16 in time for sentencing. 
17 MR. CRAMER: Okay. I'll prepare that and have that 
18 ready for the Court. Does the Court want findings or just a 
19 one-page order? 
20 THE COURT: (Inaudible) the case is asking for. 
21 MR. HALLS: I think we're going to need findings. 
22 MR. CRAMER: I think it would be safer with findings 
23 and conclusions, your Honor. 
2 4 MR. HALLS: If you want — you can get a transcript of 
25 the tape. 
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1 MR. CRAMER: I'll get a video. Yeah, I always get a 
2 video. 
3 THE COURT: You mean, findings on the motion to 
4 suppress or just findings on the reservation of the right to 
5 appeal? 
6 MR. CRAMER: No, I think — 
7 MR. HALLS: Just on the motion to suppress? 
8 MR. CRAMER: -- on the motion to suppress. I think 
9 your Honor (inaudible) — 
10 THE COURT: If you want to do that, that's fine. 
11 The key question is whether you get the preservation of your 
12 rights. I think I'm comfortable that I have in orally what I 
13 need as far as findings are concerned. 
14 MR. CRAMER: I believe so, your Honor. I think it 
15 just should be followed, just for good practice, with an order 
16 reflecting those. 
17 THE COURT: Okay. Then since Mr. Halls won, he'd have 
18 the first crack at that, if you want to prepare that order, 
19 Mr. Halls. 
2 0 MR. HALLS: Okay. 
21 THE COURT: And then I think you need an order on the 
22 Seary reservation. 
23 MR. CRAMER: All right, your Honor. I'll prepare one 
24 of those. 
25 THE COURT: I'll refer this matter to Adult Probation 
-40-
1 and Parole. Sentencing will be — well, we'll try to make 
2 that on January 31st. (Inaudible)? 
3 MR. CRAMER: Your Honor, I have a sentencing in 
4 Duchesne on the same day. Could I go to the next available 
5 date? Would that be all right with the Court? 
6 I THE COURT: If your client's willing to wait that long. 
7 MR. CRAMER: Yeah. You have a right to be sentenced in 
8 not more than 45 days. Do you waive that right? 
9 MR. KARSTEN: Yes. 
10 THE COURT: February 14th. 
11 MR. CRAMER: Is that a Monday, your Honor? 
12 THE COURT: Yes. 
13 MR. CRAMER: That's fine. 
14 THE COURT: All right. Your sentencing will be on 
15 February 14th at 9:30 a.m. You have to contact Adult Probation 
16 and Parole. There's a phone number here, and you'll need this 
17 packet for your first encounter. 
18 MR. CRAMER: May I approach, your Honor? 
19 THE COURT: Yes. That's it. 
20 MR. CRAMER: That's all I have, your Honor. May I be 
21 excused? 
22 THE COURT: Yes. 
23 MR. CRAMER: Thank you. 
24 (Hearing concluded) 
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